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JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT concurs in part and dissents in part.
JUSTICE EID dissents, and JUSTICE COATS joins in the dissent.
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¶1

We granted certiorari review to consider whether several food and beverage

concessionaires at a city-owned airport hold taxable possessory interests under our
three-prong test established in Board of County Commissioners v. Vail Associates, Inc.,
19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001). In Vail Associates, we held that a private possessory interest
in tax-exempt government property1 is taxable if it exhibits significant incidents of
private ownership that distinguish it from the government’s underlying tax-exempt
ownership. Id. at 1279. We articulated three factors demonstrating such incidents of
private ownership: (1) whether the possessory interest provides a revenue-generating
capability independent of the government property owner; (2) whether the possessory
interest owner is able to exclude others from making the same use of the interest; and
(3) whether the possessory interest is of sufficient duration to realize a private benefit
therefrom.

Id.

In this case, we also granted review to consider whether the

concessionaires’ interests, if taxable, were properly valued under the possessory interest
valuation provisions in section 39-1-103(17), C.R.S. (2014).
The State Division of Taxation defines a possessory interest in public property as: “A
private property interest in government-owned property or the right to the occupancy
and use of any benefit in government-owned property that has been granted under
lease, permit, license, concession, contract, or other agreement.” 3 Assessor’s Reference
Library 7.70 (rev. Mar. 2014). Because we rely on the Division’s definition of
“possessory interest” in the context of this case, we must analyze whether the particular
“possessory interest” is sufficiently exclusive to determine whether it is taxable under
Vail Associates. We note that, in the real property context, a possessory interest
necessarily connotes an interest that is exclusive. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 1353 (10th
ed. 2014) (defining possessory interest as “[t]he present right to control property,
including the right to exclude others, by a person who is not necessarily the owner”);
Restatement (First) of Prop. § 7 (1936) (defining possessory interest as “a physical
relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree of physical control over the
land, and an intent so to exercise such control as to exclude other members of society in
general from any present occupation of the land”).
1
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¶2

Relying on Vail Associates, the City and County of Denver (“City”) assessed

property taxes on the concessionaires’ possessory interests in their airport concession
spaces and valued those interests in accordance with section 39-1-103(17).

The

concessionaires protested the valuation and eventually filed suit in district court,
arguing that their possessory interests do not meet the independence and exclusivity
prongs of the Vail Associates test.
valuation.

The concessionaires also contested the City’s

The trial court ruled that the concessionaires’ interests meet the Vail

Associates test and adopted the valuation that the City presented at trial.
¶3

The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the concessionaires’ interests were

taxable under Vail Associates. Cantina Grill, JV v. City & Cnty. of Denver Bd. of
Equalization, 2012 COA 154, ¶¶ 28–42, 292 P.3d 1144, 1150–52. It reasoned that the
concessionaires could exclude others from using their particular concession spaces and
that the concessionaires’ revenue came from the traveling public, not the City. Id. The
court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s adoption of the City’s valuation. Id. at ¶¶
43–54, 292 P.3d at 1152–53.
¶4

We affirm.

We agree with the court of appeals that the concessionaires’

possessory interests in their concession spaces are taxable interests under the
three-factor test established in Vail Associates.

The concessionaires’ interests are

sufficiently exclusive because the concessionaires have the right to exclude others from
using their respective concession spaces to operate a concession business. In addition,
the totality of the circumstances reflects that the concessionaires’ revenue-generating
capability is independent of the City. Finally,
5

the

City’s

valuation

of

the

concessionaires’ interests is consistent with the General Assembly’s possessory interest
valuation scheme set forth in section 39-1-103(17) and is supported by the record.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶5

The petitioners (“Concessionaires”) are holders of possessory interests in real

property owned by the City. Concessionaires operate eleven restaurants and lounges at
Denver International Airport (“DIA”). The City owns the property and improvements
at DIA. Because DIA is owned by the City, it is exempt from real property taxation. See
Colo. Const. art. X, § 4.
¶6

Concessionaires obtained their possessory interests from the City through

written concession agreements.2 The concession agreements grant Concessionaires the
“right to occupy, improve, and use the Concession Space” for food and beverage
services “consistent with and subject to all of the terms and provisions of [the]
Agreement.”

Under the agreements, the City reserves the right to grant other

concessionaires the right to sell food and beverages in other locations at DIA.
¶7

In consideration for the possessory interests granted under the agreements,

Concessionaires pay the greater of either: (1) a defined percentage of their monthly
gross revenues, which may fluctuate monthly or seasonally; or (2) a minimum monthly
guarantee, which is calculated by applying a fixed price per square foot to the total
square footage of the space exclusively possessed by the Concessionaire. The City has

Although Concessionaires operate under separate concession agreements, they
acknowledge that the agreements are virtually identical. Thus, we refer to the
concession agreements collectively and quote the exemplar agreement submitted into
evidence at trial as Exhibit 1.
2
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the authority to reestablish rentals, fees, and charges, provided that the adjustments are
“nondiscriminatory and reasonable in relation to the cost of providing, operating, and
maintaining property, services and facilities of the airport system.” The concession
agreements expressly provide that “the City shall not be construed or held to be a
partner, associate, or joint venturer of Concessionaire in the conduct of its business.”
¶8

Under the concession agreements, Concessionaires are required to supply

sufficient goods and products to fully stock their concession spaces. Concessionaires
are also responsible for the expenses associated with renovating their concession spaces;
furnishing, installing, and maintaining ductwork and connections for heating and air
conditioning, water, electricity, natural gas, and lighting; and providing janitorial and
maintenance services for their concession spaces.
¶9

The concession agreements also impose certain operating restrictions on

Concessionaires. For example, Concessionaires may use their concession spaces only
for food and beverage services; they may not charge more than 110% of “street prices”
charged in non-airport restaurants offering similar food and services in the Denver
metropolitan area; they must obtain the City’s approval to change their menus or prices,
or to stay open fewer than sixteen hours per day; and they must require their officers,
contractors, agents, and employees to comply with all airport security regulations
adopted by the City. Testimony at trial indicated that these restrictions flow from
Concessionaires’ non-traditional location at the airport.
¶10

Beginning with the 2001 tax year, the City assessed Concessionaires’ concession

spaces as taxable possessory interests in tax-exempt property, relying on this court’s
7

opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Vail Associates, Inc., 19 P.3d 1263 (Colo.
2001). The City then valued those interests in accordance with section 39-1-103(17),
C.R.S. (2014).
¶11

In July 2010, Concessionaires protested the notice of valuation regarding their

concession spaces for that year and petitioned the City and County of Denver Board of
Equalization to review the valuations. The Board denied Concessionaires’ petitions,
and Concessionaires sought review in district court under section 39-8-108, C.R.S.
(2014).
¶12

The case proceeded to a trial de novo in June 2011, and the trial court issued a

written ruling that largely affirmed the valuation.3

Relevant here, the trial court

concluded that Concessionaires’ possessory interests in tax-exempt property were
subject to taxation under this court’s three-factor test set forth in Vail Associates. The
trial court also adopted the valuation that the City presented at trial.
¶13

On appeal, Concessionaires challenged, among other things, the trial court’s

conclusion that their possessory interests are taxable under the independence and
exclusivity prongs of the Vail Associates test. Concessionaires further argued that even
if their interests are taxable, the trial court erred in approving the City’s valuation. The
court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Concessionaires’ possessory interests are
sufficiently independent under the Vail Associates test because Concessionaires’ source
of revenue is the traveling public, not the City. Cantina Grill, ¶¶ 33–36, 292 P.3d at
The trial court did not affirm valuations for three specific locations that a
representative of the City Assessor admitted at trial were improperly valued. The trial
court adopted the City representative’s amended valuation.
3
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1150–51. The court also concluded that Concessionaires’ possessory interests meet the
exclusivity factor of the Vail Associates test because Concessionaires can exclude others
from using their particular concession spaces. Id. at ¶¶ 39–42, 292 P.3d at 1151–52.
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the record supported the trial court’s
adoption of the City’s valuation. Id. at ¶ 54, 292 P.3d at 1153.
¶14

We granted Concessionaires’ petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court

of appeals’ opinion regarding the taxability of Concessionaires’ possessory interests
under Vail Associates and the City’s valuation of those interests under section
39-1-103(17).

II. Standard of Review
¶15

An assessor’s valuation of property for taxation is presumed to be correct.

Arapahoe Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Podoll, 935 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo. 1997). Thus, to
rebut that presumption, a taxpayer who challenges an assessment bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the assessor’s valuation is incorrect.
Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson, 105 P.3d 198, 204 (Colo. 2005). When a party
appeals a taxing authority’s decision to the district court, the court conducts a trial de
novo and enters its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. § 39-8-108(1), C.R.S.
(2014); Podoll, 935 P.2d at 18.

Appellate courts review the district court’s factual

findings for an abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo. § 39-8-108(3);
E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 3 P.3d 18, 22 (Colo. 2000).

9

III. Taxability of Concessionaires’ Possessory Interests
¶16

The first issue in this case is whether Concessionaires’ possessory interests in

their concession spaces at DIA are taxable property even though the underlying real
property is tax-exempt because it is owned by the City. We first discuss the principles
that underlie taxation of possessory interests in tax-exempt property and relate these
principles to the three-prong test set forth in Board of County Commissioners v. Vail
Associates, Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1275 (Colo. 2001). We then apply the Vail Associates test
to Concessionaires’ possessory interests.

A. The Vail Associates Test
¶17

The Colorado Constitution requires uniform taxation of all real and personal

property unless article X specifically exempts the property from taxation. Colo. Const.
art. X, § 3(1)(a) (“Each property tax levy shall be uniform upon all real and personal
property not exempt from taxation under this article located within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax.”); id. § 6 (“All laws exempting from taxation property
other than that specified in this article shall be void.”); see also Mesa Verde Co. v.
Montezuma Cnty. Bd. of Equalization (Mesa Verde III), 898 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1995)
(“[T]he general assembly may not exempt from taxation any property which is not
specifically exempted in Article X of the Colorado Constitution.”); Denver Beechcraft,
Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Colo., 681 P.2d 945, 948 (Colo. 1984) (same).4

Corporations and corporate property are expressly subject to taxation. See Colo.
Const. art. X, § 9 (“The power to tax corporations and corporate property, real and
personal, shall never be relinquished or suspended.”); id. § 10 (“All corporations in this
state, or doing business therein, shall be subject to taxation for state, county, school,
4
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¶18

Article X exempts certain classes of property from taxation, including, as relevant

here, “property . . . of the state, counties, cities, towns, and other municipal corporations
and public libraries.” Colo. Const. art. X, § 4. Although not listed in article X, we have
also long recognized that “property owned by the United States government may not
be subjected to state taxation under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.” Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d at 1271 (quoting Mesa Verde III, 898 P.2d at 7).
¶19

Colorado’s property tax statutes likewise reflect that all real and personal

property is taxable, except that exempted by law. Section 39-1-102(16), C.R.S. (2014),
states that taxable property “means all property, real and personal, not expressly
exempted from taxation by law.” As relevant here, “real property” includes “[a]ll lands
or interests in lands” and “[i]mprovements.” § 39-1-102(14)(a), (c) (emphasis added).
This statutory definition of “real property” has remained essentially unchanged for
over a century. See ch. 3, sec. 13, 1901 Colo. Sess. Laws, 43, 45.
¶20

Generally, interests in real property that are less than fee ownership are assessed

under the “unit assessment rule,” a rule of property taxation that requires all estates in a
unit of real property to be assessed together and the real estate, as an entirety, to be
assessed to the owner of the fee. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
848 P.2d 355, 358 (Colo. 1993).5 The rule prohibits assessments on multiple taxpayers

municipal and other purposes, on the real and personal property owned or used by
them within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”).
This rule is established by section 39-1-106, C.R.S. (2014), which provides that “[f]or
purposes of property taxation, it shall make no difference that the use, possession, or
ownership of any taxable property is qualified, limited, not the subject of alienation, or
the subject of levy or distraint separately from the particular tax derivable therefrom.”
5
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holding different interests in a single property. See id. at 359. Thus, where there are
taxable interests in property that are less than fee ownership, such as a leasehold
interest,

“both

the

lessor’s

interest

and

the

lessee’s

interest

are

assessed

simultaneously,” and the property is taxed to the fee owner “as though it was an
unencumbered fee.” Id. Under this method, “taxation of the whole is presumed to
include taxation of the derivative parts, with the owner passing on the burden of
taxation as the fee owner chooses.” Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d at 1278.
¶21

However, where the fee owner is the government and therefore not subject to

taxation, “the unit assessment rule operates to tax the private ownership interest in the
land and improvements together in the absence of a fee owner who pays the full taxes.”
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). Section 39-1-107(4), C.R.S. (2014), now expressly provides
that “[t]he property tax on a possessory interest in real or personal property that is
exempt from taxation under this article shall be assessed to the holder of the possessory
interest and collected in the same manner as property taxes assessed to owners of real
or personal property.”6
¶22

Our jurisprudence reflects that taxation of private possessory interests in

government-owned land is both appropriate and required under article X of the
Colorado Constitution and Colorado’s property tax statutes where: (1) the private
possessory interest is distinct from the government’s ownership interest; and (2)

The General Assembly added subsection (4) to section 39-1-107 after this court
reiterated in Vail Associates, 19 P.3d at 1280, that possessory interests in otherwise
tax-exempt property are taxable under the Colorado property tax scheme. See ch. 268,
sec. 3, § 39-1-107(4), 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1008, 1008–09.
6
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taxation of the private interest does not effectively constitute a tax on the government’s
ownership interest.7
¶23

For example, in Rummel v. Musgrave, 350 P.2d 825 (Colo. 1960), we held that a

private possessory interest in producing uranium lands obtained under a lease with the
United States was subject to taxation by the State. We first determined that “[t]he lease
in question is separate property, vendible, subject to the consent of the lessor and
inheritable.” Id. 826. Accordingly, the possessory interest was taxable unless the tax
could be said to be upon the “separate and distinct ownership of the federal
government.” Id. Turning to whether taxation would be a tax on the government’s
ownership interest, we concluded that “it is obvious that no burden is placed upon the
United States Government in either a direct or indirect manner by the tax in question.”
Id. at 827. Thus, we concluded that the State had properly levied and collected taxes on
the possessory interests held by the mining company.
¶24

Similarly, in Mesa Verde Co. v. Board of County Commissioners (Mesa Verde I),

495 P.2d 229, 234 (Colo. 1972), we held that a concessionaire’s possessory interest in the
improvements it constructed to conduct its services for the public at Mesa Verde
National Park were taxable even though the federal government retained title to the
improvements. We first ascertained the concessionaire’s interest in the improvements

Our prior cases in this area involved taxation of possessory interests in federal
government-owned land. As noted above, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution bars taxation of the federal government’s ownership interest. Mesa Verde
III, 898 P.2d at 8–9. The Colorado Constitution similarly bars taxation of “property . . .
of the state, counties, cities, towns, and other municipal corporations and public
libraries.” Colo. Const. art. X, § 4.
7
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by analyzing the concessionaire’s contract with the government as well as the parties’
actions under the contract. Id. at 232–33. We noted, for example, that the contract
provisions revealed “the parties’ intention to accord Mesa Verde Company a large
amount of decisional authority and discretion with respect to its improvements,” id. at
232, and that the concessionaire normally paid “the entire cost of constructing its
improvements” and retained “all profits derived from its operations.” Id. at 233. We
concluded that the concessionaire’s interests reflected “significant incidents of
ownership.” Id. at 233. As such, we determined that the concessionaire’s interests were
taxable. See id. We observed that strong policy considerations supported our decision
to allow ad valorem taxation of the concessionaire’s improvements, noting that “where
a party has the right to possession, use, enjoyment, and profits of the property, that
party should not be permitted to use the bare legal title of the Government to avoid his
fair and just share of state taxation.” Id.
¶25

After we decided Mesa Verde I, the General Assembly enacted a statute

exempting certain private possessory interests from taxation, including interests in
federal park land obtained under a lease or concession agreement. See Mesa Verde III,
898 P.2d at 6–7 (citing § 39-3-135(4)(c), C.R.S. (1994)).

Despite this provision, the

Montezuma County Assessor assessed Mesa Verde Company’s use of, and possessory
interest in, federal land for its concession at Mesa Verde National Park. Id. at 2.8 Mesa

Thus, whereas Mesa Verde I concerned the concessionaire’s possessory interest in the
improvements it had constructed to perform its services, Mesa Verde III concerned the
concessionaire’s possessory interest in the real property (federal land) it occupied and
used for its concession.
8

14

Verde challenged the assessment, contending it was exempt from property tax under
the statute. The County argued that, to the extent the statute created an exemption for
Mesa Verde’s possessory interest, it violated article X of the Colorado Constitution. Id.
at 3. We agreed.
¶26

We determined that Mesa Verde’s possessory rights under its concession

agreement were “interest[s] in land” and “real property,” and thus taxable under article
X and the General Assembly’s definition of taxable property in section 39-1-102(16). Id.
at 4–5. We then held that the statute exempting such possessory interests from taxation
was unconstitutional because “the general assembly may not exempt from taxation any
property which is not specifically exempted in Article X of the Colorado Constitution.”
Id. at 7. Finally, we held that state taxation of such possessory interests did not violate
the Supremacy Clause because “the federal government’s constitutional immunity from
state taxation is not infringed when a state imposes a tax on private corporations and
they are entities independent of the United States using property in connection with
their own commercial activities for profit-making.” Id. at 9.
¶27

In 1996, in response to Mesa Verde III, the General Assembly again sought to

exempt certain possessory interests from taxation.

The General Assembly enacted

section 39-3-136, declaring that certain possessory interests in tax-exempt property
“shall not be subject to property taxation unless specific statutory provisions have been
enacted that direct the taxation of such possessory interests.” Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d at
1272 (citing § 39-3-136(2), C.R.S. (2000)). Around the time of this enactment, the Eagle
County Assessor assessed Vail Associates, Inc.’s possessory interests in land obtained
15

under a special use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. The permit entitled Vail to
occupy, use, and enjoy 12,590 acres of national forest land to operate the Vail ski resort.
Id. at 1267.

Vail challenged Eagle County’s assessment on the grounds that its

possessory interest was exempt from taxation under section 39-3-136. Id. at 1267–68. In
Vail Associates, we ultimately held that this legislation unconstitutionally exempted
some private possessory interests in tax-exempt property from taxation, contrary to
article X and our decision in Mesa Verde III. Id. at 1267.
¶28

We observed that “the principal design of the constitution’s revenue provisions

is to subject all private real and personal property to the payment of its fair proportion
of taxation necessary for governmental purposes, unless the property falls within a
constitutionally stated category of exemption.” Id. at 1273. We also observed that the
1996 amendments to the property tax statutes did not alter the longstanding statutory
definition of “real property” in section 39-1-102(14)(a), or otherwise redefine real or
personal property to exclude possessory interests. Id. at 1275. We concluded that the
statutory provision instead improperly exempted certain possessory interests from
taxation in violation of the Colorado Constitution’s requirement in article X that all real
and personal property be taxed. Id. at 1278.
¶29

After concluding that the exemption in section 39-3-136 was unconstitutional, we

discussed the necessary requirements for lawful taxation of a private possessory interest
in tax-exempt government property. Id. at 1278–79. Drawing from our prior cases, we
determined that “for taxation to occur, the possessory interest in tax-exempt property
must exhibit significant incidents of private ownership that distinguish it from the
16

underlying tax-exempt ownership.” Id. at 1279. This is because the taxation of private
possessory

interests

in

government

lands—which

is

permissible—must

be

distinguished from taxation of the government’s underlying ownership of the land. Id.
at 1278. We then articulated three factors demonstrating such incidents of private
ownership: (1) whether the possessory interest provides a revenue-generating
capability independent of the government property owner; (2) whether the possessory
interest owner can exclude others from making the same use of the interest; and (3)
whether the possessory interest is of sufficient duration to realize a private benefit
therefrom. Id. at 1279.
¶30

Finally, applying this three-factor test, we concluded that Vail’s possessory

interest under the special use permit was real property taxable under article X because
Vail “owns a significant ownership interest in federal property from which it derives
revenues for private benefit; it can exclude others from using the federal property it
occupies for the same use, and its interest extends to the year 2031, a significant period
of time for realizing its private benefit.” Id. at 1280.
¶31

In sum, Colorado’s constitution and property tax statutes reflect that all real and

personal property is taxable, except for property that is expressly exempted from
taxation by law. Colo. Const. art. X, §§ 3(1)(a), 4, 6, 9, 10; § 39-1-102(16). Moreover,
Colorado property tax statutes have long defined “real property” to include “interests
in land” and “[i]mprovements.” § 39-1-102(14)(a), (c). Our case law reflects that a
possessory interest in tax-exempt property is taxable where the interest exhibits
significant incidents of private ownership that distinguish it from the underlying
17

government ownership.

The factors demonstrating significant incidents of private

ownership ensure that the interest is indeed a taxable property interest under article X
of the Colorado Constitution and the property tax statutes and, importantly, that
taxation of the interest does not effectively constitute a tax on the government’s
underlying ownership interest.

B. Application
¶32

Concessionaires’ written concession agreements grant them the “right to occupy,

improve, and use” their respective concession spaces for food and beverage services
“consistent with and subject to all of the terms and provisions of [the] Agreement.”
Concessionaires contend that their possessory interests in concession spaces at DIA are
not taxable under the first two factors of this court’s test in Vail Associates. Specifically,
Concessionaires contend that: (1) their use and possession of the concession spaces are
not sufficiently exclusive; and (2) their revenue-generating capability is not independent
of the City.

1. Exclusivity
¶33

Concessionaires argue that their use is not exclusive because the concession

agreements permit the City to grant other concessionaires the right to operate
restaurants and sell food and beverages in other locations at DIA. We disagree.
¶34

The exclusivity factor of the Vail Associates test ensures that the interest to be

taxed is indeed a property interest that is taxable under article X and the revenue
statutes. To be taxable under article X of the Colorado Constitution, the possessory
interest must be sufficiently exclusive to qualify as a real property interest as defined
18

under the revenue statutes. In Vail Associates, we indicated that the exclusivity prong
turns on “the ability of the possessory interest owner to exclude others from making the
same use of the interest.” 19 P.3d at 1279. We noted that although some degree of
exclusivity is required for possessory interest taxation, “neither absolute control nor
absolute exclusivity is required.” Id. at 1279 n.21 (quoting Power Res. Coop. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 996 P.2d 969, 973 (Or. 2000)). We also noted that “concurrent uses of property
are not necessarily inconsistent with exclusivity.” Id. (citing City of San Jose v. Carlson,
67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Scott–Free River Expeditions, Inc. v. Cnty.
of El Dorado, 250 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)). Therefore, we determined
that even though Vail was operating under a special use permit that reserved the right
of the Forest Service to allow uses by others that did not materially interfere with the ski
resort’s uses under its permit, its interest was sufficiently exclusive because the ski
resort could “exclude others from using the federal property it occupie[d] for the same
use.” Id. at 1266, 1280.
¶35

Importantly, our analysis in Vail Associates focused on whether the ski resort’s

use of the particular area it occupied was sufficiently exclusive. In other words, our
inquiry regarding exclusivity did not turn on whether the Forest Service leased lands to
other ski resorts on nearby government land.
¶36

Case law in the real property context supports the notion that exclusivity refers

to the interest holder’s ability to exclude others from the same use of the particular area

19

it occupies.9 In Bernhardt v. Hemphill, 878 P.2d 107, 113 (Colo. App. 1994), the court of
appeals analyzed whether a real property interest was created through a time-share
contract. In its analysis, the court of appeals focused on whether the contract entitled
the time-share owner to the exclusive use of any particular unit. Id. The court of
appeals held that the time-share contract did not transfer a real property interest
because it did not provide the right to reserve “any particular unit, for any particular
annual period.” Id. In contrast, a “time-span estate,” which is legislatively recognized
as a distinct interest in real property, includes, among other requirements, “[a]n
exclusive right to possession and occupancy of the unit during an annually recurring
period of time.” § 38-33-110(8)(b), C.R.S. (2014); see Bd. of Cnty Comm’rs v. Colo. Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 628 P.2d 156, 158 (Colo. App. 1981) (stating that section 38-33-110
is “a legislative recognition of the time share estate as a distinct interest in real
property”).
¶37

In this case, the concession agreements and testimony at trial established that

each Concessionaire has the right to exclude others from using that Concessionaire’s
particular concession space to operate a concession business.

The concession

agreements grant Concessionaires the “right to occupy, improve, and use the
Concession Space consistent with and subject to all of the terms and provisions of [the]
Agreement.” Nothing in the concession agreements allows the City to permit a second

Because the revenue statutes define “real property” as including “[a]ll lands or
interests in lands” and “[i]mprovements,” § 39-1-102(14), we determine that our case
law defining real property in other contexts is also illuminating on the issue of
exclusivity.
9
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concessionaire the right to operate out of an existing Concessionaire’s location. Indeed,
Concessionaires’ witness, who is a managing member of all the concessions at issue in
this case, admitted at trial that only the particular Concessionaire “has the right to
occupy, use, improve, and generate revenue from that concession space.” Based on the
concession agreements and testimony at trial, the trial court found that “[n]o other
concessionaires have the right to use the [Concessionaires’] concession spaces,” and
“the City does not permit anyone else to use those particular concession spaces to
operate a business[].”
¶38

Concessionaires point to language in the concession agreements to argue that

their interests are not exclusive:
City reserves the right to grant to other concessionaires the right to
operate restaurants and sell food and beverages in other locations in the
Airport, and Concessionaire understands and agrees that its right to the
permitted uses is not exclusive.
(Emphasis added.) Testimony at trial established that under this provision, the City has
permitted Concessionaires’ direct competitors to operate in areas near Concessionaires’
existing spaces.
¶39

We disagree that this language in the agreements is fatal to the taxability of

Concessionaires’ interests. The provision permits the City to enter into agreements with
other concessionaires to sell food and beverages at other locations at DIA. It does not
permit the City to allow a second concessionaire to operate a concession out of an
existing Concessionaire’s location. Because the exclusivity factor focuses on whether
the interest holder’s use of a particular area it occupies is sufficiently exclusive, the
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interest holder’s inability to exclude competition from other locations is not probative of
exclusivity.

Therefore, we find Concessionaires’ reliance on this provision

unpersuasive.
¶40

In sum, the exclusivity factor in this case is met because Concessionaires have the

right to exclude others from using each of their concession spaces to operate a
concession business. That a competitor may operate a concession at a nearby location
has no bearing on this factor.

2. Independence
¶41

Concessionaires

argue

that

their

revenue-generating

capability

is

not

independent of the City because of the extensive operating restrictions imposed on
them under their concession agreements. The court of appeals rejected this argument,
concluding that the independence prong of Vail Associates turns not on the level of
control exercised by the government owner, but instead on the source of the possessory
interest holder’s revenue and, more specifically, whether the government owner is the
only or the dominant source of that revenue. Cantina Grill, ¶ 33, 292 P.3d at 1150–51.
We disagree with the court of appeals that operating restrictions are irrelevant to the
independence inquiry. See id. at ¶ 35, 292 P.3d at 1151. However, we conclude that the
City’s operating restrictions in this case do not deprive Concessionaires of the
independent revenue-generating capability of their concession spaces.
¶42

As discussed above, in considering the taxability of private possessory interests

in tax-exempt land, care must be taken to ensure that the tax is indeed imposed on a
private interest, rather than on the underlying government-owned property. Thus, a
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possessory interest is taxable only if “it provides a revenue-generating capability to the
private owner independent of the government property owner.” Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d
at 1279 (emphasis added). This factor ensures that the tax falls on the private interest,
as distinguished from the government. See id.
¶43

In Vail Associates, we concluded that “Vail owns a significant ownership interest

in federal property from which it derives revenues for private benefit.” Id. at 1280.
Although this statement acknowledged Vail’s “revenue-generating capability,” it did
not analyze the requisite degree of “independence” from the government property
owner. We discussed neither the source of the ski resort’s revenues nor any restrictions
the government placed on the resort’s operations.
¶44

Because Vail Associates does not further define the independence factor, we look

to other Colorado case law for additional guidance. This case law demonstrates that the
degree of control exercised by the possessory interest holder, not merely its source of
revenue, is relevant to determining whether the possessory interest holder’s
revenue-generating capability is sufficiently independent from the government.
¶45

In Mesa Verde I, we upheld a property tax on improvements located on federally

owned property used by Mesa Verde Company, a private concessionaire. 495 P.2d at
234. In upholding the tax, we emphasized that the contractual provisions reflected the
parties’ intent to accord Mesa Verde “a large amount of decisional authority and
discretion with respect to its improvements.” Id. at 232. We observed, for example, that
Mesa Verde had authority, subject to the government’s approval, to build
improvements; to transfer, assign, encumber, or mortgage its possessory interest; and to
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charge the public appropriate rates in connection with its use. Id. We further observed
that Mesa Verde was contractually required to provide all necessary maintenance and
repairs on the improvements. Id.
¶46

By contrast, the concessionaire in Southern Cafeteria, Inc. v. Property Tax

Administrator lacked sufficient independence from the federal government. 677 P.2d
362, 364–65 (Colo. App. 1983). In that case, Southern Cafeteria provided food service at
the Denver Federal Center under a General Services Administration contract. Id. at 363.
The

court

of

appeals

distinguished

Southern

Cafeteria’s

interest

from

the

concessionaire’s interest in Mesa Verde I. Under Southern Cafeteria’s contract, the
federal government provided essentially all of the equipment necessary for the
operation. Id. The government also maintained and repaired the building structures.
Id. at 365. Finally, the government also controlled the pricing structure and fixed the
amount of profit the cafeteria could realize. Id. at 363, 365. Under these circumstances,
the court of appeals determined that Southern Cafeteria was not independent of the
federal government and its interest under its concession agreement was not taxable. Id.
at 365. Importantly, the court of appeals rejected the property tax administrator’s
argument that the assessment was lawful because Southern Cafeteria was not paid a fee
but instead operated cafeterias and snack bars for a profit, meaning that its revenues
did not come directly from the government. The court focused not on the source of the
revenue but on the concessionaire’s lack of independence, finding no distinction
between the government “paying [a contractor] a fixed profit and fixing a ceiling on
Southern Cafeteria’s profits on its own operation.” Id.
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¶47

The principles embodied in Mesa Verde I and Southern Cafeteria are reflected in

section 39-1-103(17)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2014), which excludes management contracts from
possessory interest taxation. Under section 39-1-103(17)(a)(III), the source of revenue is
not dispositive as to whether a government contractor is statutorily exempt from
possessory interest taxation.

Rather, the exemption may apply either where the

contractor operates the government’s property for a fee, or where the government
controls the amount of profit the contractor can realize or sets the prices charged by the
contractor. § 39-1-103(17)(a)(III)(C). This section also sets forth additional criteria,
namely: (1) whether the government provides all funds to operate the property; (2)
whether the government owns all of the property used in the operation of the property
subject to the contract; (3) whether the government reserves the right to use the
property; (4) whether the property is maintained and repaired at the expense of the
government; and (5) whether the management contractor has no leasehold or similar
interest in the property.10 § 39-1-103(17)(a)(III)(A), (B), (D), (E), (G).
¶48

Finally, case law we relied upon in Vail Associates in articulating the three-factor

test supports the notion that the independence inquiry does not turn on the source of
revenue alone. For instance, in California, the independence factor is “measured by the
amount of routine control and supervision enjoyed by the user, with the recognition
that the government owner necessarily retains ultimate control.” City of San Jose, 67
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Cal. Rev.
Where the contractor uses the government property for a manufacturing process,
section 39-1-103(17)(a)(III)(F) provides that whether the government owns all or
substantially all of the personal property used in the process is also relevant.
10
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& Tax Code § 107(a)(1) (defining independent as “the ability to exercise authority and
exert control over the management or operation of the property or improvements”),
cited in Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d at 1279 n.21. If the government owner retains sufficient
control, “the user may be considered to be an agent, and the [government’s] immunity
from taxation extends to the user.” City of San Jose, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (citations
omitted). This agency approach is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s
view that the Supremacy Clause bars taxation where “the levy falls on the [federal
government] itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the
Government that the two cannot be realistically viewed as separate entities, at least
insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned.” United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S.
730, 735 (1982).
¶49

Thus, the independence factor, first articulated in Vail Associates, does not focus

solely on the interest holder’s source of the revenue. Instead, we look to the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether an interest holder’s revenue-generating
capability is truly independent from the government, or whether the interest holder is
merely an agent of the government, such that any tax on the interest holder would be a
tax on the government.

These circumstances include, but are not limited to:

(1)

whether the government pays a fee to the interest holder for its operation of the
property in question; (2) whether the government controls the prices the interest holder
can charge or restricts the profits the interest holder can generate; (3) whether the
interest holder provides the supplies, equipment, and improvements necessary for the
operation of the property; (4) whether the interest holder is responsible for the expense
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of maintaining and repairing the property; and (5) whether the interest holder has
sufficient control and supervision of its operation.11 See Mesa Verde I, 495 P.2d at 232;
Southern Cafeteria, 677 P.2d at 363–65; see also § 39-1-103(17)(a)(III).
¶50

Applying this test to the facts here, we conclude that Concessionaires’

revenue-generating capability is sufficiently independent from the City that the
independence factor is met.
¶51

First, Concessionaires’ revenue comes from the traveling public, and, in contrast

to Southern Cafeteria, the City does control the amount of profit that Concessionaires
can make. Concessionaires can set their own prices, subject to the City’s approval.
Although the City restricts the prices to a maximum of 110% of “street prices,” this
restriction protects the traveling public from price-gouging; its purpose is not to control
Concessionaires’ profit.
¶52

Second, Concessionaires are responsible for the cost of supplies, equipment, and

improvements for the operation of their concession spaces. The concession agreements
require Concessionaires to “supply sufficient goods and products to fully stock [their]
concession spaces.” Concessionaires are also required by the agreements to install a
water meter, electric meter, and gas meter, if required, at Concessionaires’ expense.
Finally, the concession agreements require Concessionaires to renovate their concession
spaces at their “sole cost and expense.” Such renovations include furniture, fixtures,
We emphasize that a possessory interest is not taxable just because the interest holder
has any revenue-generating capability independent of the government. Courts should
apply the multi-factor test we lay out here to determine whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, an interest holder’s revenue-generating capability is truly
independent from the government.
11
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and equipment. Though the improvements affixed to the realty become property of the
City, private commercial leases similarly vest ownership of the improvements in the
lessor upon termination.

See, e.g., Highlands Ranch Univ. Park, LLC v. Uno of

Highlands Ranch, Inc., 129 P.3d 1020, 1022 (Colo. App. 2005) (evaluating a lease that
required lessee to construct building and that vested ownership in lessor upon
termination).
¶53

Third, Concessionaires are responsible for the expense of maintaining and

repairing their concession spaces.

The concession agreements provide that

Concessionaires are responsible for the expense of janitorial services and maintenance
for the concession spaces, including redecoration, painting, and repair and replacement
of the worn furnishings. Moreover, Concessionaires are responsible for casualty loss of
the improvements, as provided by the concession agreements.
¶54

Finally, while the City imposes operating restrictions related to some aspects of

Concessionaires’ operations, such as the price of their products, hours of operation, and
menus, these operating restrictions do not deprive Concessionaires of control and
supervision of their operations. Cf. United States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184, 1186
(D. Colo. 1978) (noting that the government contractor’s “entire role or relationship” to
the property it managed was defined by contract), aff’d, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980),
cited in Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d at 1279. Nor do the operating restrictions in this case
convert Concessionaires into agents or partners of the City. Importantly, the concession
agreements provide that “it is expressly understood and agreed that the City shall not
be construed or held to be a partner, associate, or joint venture of Concessionaire.”
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Moreover, many of the terms concerning hours of operation and menus may be
modified with the consent of the City.

Concessionaires may even assign their

concession agreements with City approval. This is similar to Mesa Verde I, where
many of the concessionaire’s actions were subject to the government’s prior approval.
495 P.2d at 232.

That the City maintains ultimate control over some aspects of

Concessionaires’ operations is not dispositive because “[t]he governmental body that
contracted with the user has the responsibility to safeguard the use of public property,
and would be remiss if it did not retain ultimate control over such use, by grantees as
well as by the public.” City of San Jose, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
¶55

In sum, although we disagree with the court of appeals that operating

restrictions are not relevant to the independence prong, we conclude that the
independence factor is met in this case because the totality of the circumstances
indicates that Concessionaires’ revenue-generating capability is independent from the
City, such that Concessionaires are not merely the City’s agents, and a tax on
Concessionaires’ possessory interest would not be effectively a tax on the government.

C. Conclusion
¶56

Because Concessionaires’ interests are sufficiently exclusive and independent,

and Concessionaires do not dispute that their interests are of sufficient duration, we
conclude that Concessionaires’ interests exhibit significant incidents of ownership
under the Vail Associates test. Therefore, Concessionaires’ possessory interests are

29

taxable property under article X of the Colorado Constitution and the revenue statutes,
even though the underlying government-owned land is tax-exempt.

IV. Valuation of Concessionaires’ Possessory Interests
¶57

Concessionaires also contend that the trial court erred in approving the City’s

valuation of their possessory interests.

Specifically, Concessionaires dispute the

determination of their “reasonably estimated future annual rents,” and they also argue
that portions of their future rent should have been excluded from the valuation.
¶58

As relevant here, section 39-1-103(17), C.R.S. (2014),12 sets forth a two-step

method for the valuation of taxable possessory interests in tax-exempt properties.13
First, to calculate the actual value of the possessory interest, the assessor must calculate
the “present value of the reasonably estimated future annual rents or fees required to be
paid by the holder of the possessory interest to the owner of the underlying real or
personal property.” § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A). The “rents or fees” under this provision

In enacting section 39-1-103(17), the General Assembly provided that it would
become effective only if this court determined that the Colorado Constitution requires
taxation of possessory interests in tax-exempt property. Ch. 297, sec. 4, § 39-1-103(17),
1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1849, 1852. Thus, section 39-1-103(17) became effective in 2001
when this court held in Vail Associates that the Colorado Constitution requires taxation
of possessory interests in tax-exempt property.
12

This two-step methodology applies where the cost or income approach to appraisal is
utilized. Section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A) provides that “the actual value of a possessory
interest . . . shall be determined by appropriate consideration of the cost approach, the
market approach, and the income approach to appraisal.” The trial court found that the
assessor appropriately considered the market approach for the purposes of this
provision, but determined that the unique market at DIA and the unique circumstances
of the lease made the market approach inappropriate. This particular finding is
undisputed. Therefore, because the market approach is not appropriate, the provisions
governing the cost and income approach are applicable.
13
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shall be the “actual contract rents or fees reasonably expected to be paid . . . unless it is
shown that the actual contract rents or fees to be paid . . . are not representative of the
market rents or fees paid for that type of real or personal property.” Id. Second, the
assessor shall exclude rent and fees required to be paid for all rights other than the
exclusive right to use and possess the property. § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B). Relevant here,
the statute indicates that the following are examples of such payments that shall be
excluded: (1) “[n]onexclusive rights to use and possess . . . common areas”; (2) “rights
to conduct a business”; and (3) “reimbursement . . . of the reasonable costs of operating,
maintaining, and repairing the land, improvements, or personal property to which the
possessory interest pertains, regardless of whether such costs are separately stated,
provided that the types of such costs can be identified with reasonable certainty from
the documents granting the possessory interest.” Id.
¶59

At trial, a representative of the City’s assessor, qualified as an expert in

valuation, testified that he used the minimum monthly guarantee as the basis to
determine the “reasonably estimated future annual rents.”

Under the concession

agreements, Concessionaires pay the greater of either: (1) a defined percentage of their
monthly gross revenues, which may fluctuate monthly or seasonally; or (2) a minimum
monthly guarantee, which is calculated by applying a fixed price per square foot to the
total square footage of the space exclusively possessed by the Concessionaire. The
representative testified that he used the minimum monthly guarantee instead of the
percentage of monthly gross revenues because, regardless of circumstances,
Concessionaires would pay at least the minimum monthly guarantee in the future. The
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representative also determined that the only qualifying deduction or exclusion required
under section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B) was the value of Concessionaires’ non-exclusive
occupancy of the common areas, like food court spaces. It was undisputed that the
assessor excluded all rent that would be paid for common areas.

The trial court

ultimately adopted the representative’s valuations of Concessionaires’ possessory
interests.

A. Reasonably Estimated Future Annual Rents or Fees
¶60

Concessionaires contend that the use of the minimum monthly guarantee was

not an appropriate basis for determining the “reasonably estimated future annual rents
or fees” under section 39-1-103(17).

Section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A) provides that the

“reasonably estimated future annual rents or fees” are the “actual contract rents or fees
reasonably expected to be paid” unless it is “shown” that they “are not representative of
the market rents or fees paid for that type of real or personal property.”
Concessionaires argue that the minimum monthly guarantee was neither the “actual
contract rent . . . expected to be paid” nor was it “representative of market rents.”
¶61

First, Concessionaires argue that the minimum monthly guarantee was not

representative of the “actual contract rents or fees reasonably expected to be paid”
because most Concessionaires historically paid the percentage of monthly gross
revenues instead of minimum monthly guarantee. However, the representative’s use of
the minimum monthly guarantee, approved by the trial court, was a reasonable
estimate of future rent because Concessionaires are obligated under their concession
agreements to pay at least that amount. Though it also may have been reasonable for
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an assessor to estimate future rent based on historical payments of a percentage of
monthly gross revenues, Concessionaires have not met their burden to prove that the
use of the minimum monthly guarantee was an unreasonable estimate of future rent
under their concession agreements. See Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Sampson, 105
P.3d 198, 204 (Colo. 2005) (the taxpayer has the burden to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the valuations are incorrect).
¶62

Regardless, Concessionaires contend that the trial court erred in adopting the

representative’s valuation because the representative did not consider whether
minimum monthly guarantee was “representative of the market rents” for similar
property.

However, the trial court found, and the record supports, that the

representative did inquire into the market rate—but determined that the only
comparable market consisted of the concessions at DIA.
¶63

Thus, the trial court’s adoption of the representative’s use of the minimum

monthly guarantee as a basis for determining the “reasonably estimated future annual
rents or fees” is consistent with section 39-1-103(17) and is supported by the record.

B. Exclusions
¶64

Concessionaires also contend that the valuation does not exclude portions of

future rent that are for payments not associated with their exclusive use and occupancy
of their concession spaces. Specifically, Concessionaires contend that a portion of their
future rent should be excluded under section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B) as payments for the
right to conduct a business and as “reimbursements” to the City for the costs of
operating and maintaining the airport. We disagree.
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¶65

The concession agreements state that the “compensation” due under the

agreements is “for the rights and privileges herein granted by the City.” The rights
granted under the agreements are “the right to occupy, improve, and use the
Concession Space.” Together, these provisions indicate that the rent (or compensation)
due under the agreements is for the right to occupy, improve, and use the concession
spaces—not for the right to conduct a business or for reimbursements for operating
expenses.
¶66

Still, Concessionaires contend that a portion of their future rent should be

excluded as a payment for the right to conduct a business. Section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B)
clarifies that excludable rent for the right to conduct a business should be determined in
accordance with guidelines published by the administrator—which are contained in the
Assessor’s Reference Library (“ARL”). In providing guidance on calculating exclusions
from future rent, the ARL recognizes that possessory interest agreements are usually
structured in such a way that the rent due under the agreement already “reflect[s]
amounts after expenses and income exclusions are taken into account,” and, thus, no
exclusion under section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B) is usually necessary.

3 Assessor’s

Reference Library 7.78 (rev. Mar. 2014) (emphasis in original). However, exclusions
may be necessary when the rent due under the agreement is based on a percentage of
revenue, i.e. percentage rent. Id. When percentage rent is used as the basis to calculate
future rent, the ARL instructs assessors to compare the percentage rent to market rent to
determine the amount attributable to business value. Id. at 7.79. Where percentage rent
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is higher than market rent, the difference should be excluded as rent for the right to
conduct a business. Id.
¶67

In this case, the representative used the minimum monthly guarantee—not a

percentage of monthly gross revenues—as the basis to value Concessionaires’
possessory interests. Consistent with the ARL guidelines, the representative testified
that by using the minimum annual guarantee, he was certain that he had not captured
any value for the right to conduct a business. Moreover, the representative also testified
that the minimum monthly guarantee was representative of market rent.

Thus,

evidence presented at trial supports his assertion that no portion of that rent was
attributable to payments for the right to conduct a business because the minimum
monthly guarantee and market rent are essentially the same. We therefore conclude
that the trial court did not err in adopting the representative’s valuation that did not
exclude any portion of future rent as a payment for the right to conduct a business.
¶68

Finally,

Concessionaires

argue

that

a

portion

of

future

rent

is

for

“reimbursements” to the City for the costs of operating and maintaining the airport.
Section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B) requires an appraiser to exclude from valuation any fees
that will be paid as “reimbursement to the owner of the underlying real or personal
property of the reasonable costs of operating, maintaining, and repairing the land,
improvements, or personal property to which the possessory interest pertains.” Such
deductions, however, apply only where “the types of such costs can be identified with
reasonable certainty from the documents granting the possessory interest.” Id.
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¶69

As Concessionaires conceded at trial, nothing in the concession agreements

specifically identifies any reimbursement to the City for the costs of “operating,
maintaining, or repairing” the airport. In fact, the concession agreements provide that
the City shall maintain the terminal and concourses at its expense.
¶70

Nonetheless, Concessionaires argue that because the City can reestablish the

minimum monthly guarantee under the concession agreements in reasonable relation to
the cost of providing, operating, and maintaining the airport, such increases are
“reimbursements”

for

operating

expenses.

In

support

of

this

argument,

Concessionaires rely on several letters from the City notifying them of such increases.
The letters indicate that increases in facility costs contributed to these increases.
However, the trial court found that the “percentage increases of facility costs bear no
obvious relation to the percentage increases in the minimum guaranteed amounts.”
More importantly, nowhere do the concession agreements indicate that any portion of
payment, including that attributed to a payment increase, constitutes a reimbursement
to the City. Any City use of payments from Concessionaires to operate, maintain, and
repair the airport does not transform such payment—which the concession agreements
state is for the “right to occupy, improve and use the Concession Space”—into a
reimbursement for operating and maintaining the airport.
¶71

Therefore, we reject Concessionaires’ contention that some of their payment is

excludable either as payment for the right to conduct a business or reimbursement to
the City for operating expenses. The trial court’s adoption of the City’s valuation is
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consistent with section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(B) and the administrator’s guidance in the
ARL and is supported by the record.

V. Conclusion
¶72

We hold that Concessionaires’ possessory interests in their concession spaces are

taxable interests under article X of the Colorado Constitution and the property tax
statutes because Concessionaires’ possessory interests meet the three-prong test
established in Vail Associates.

We conclude that Concessionaires’ interests are

sufficiently exclusive because Concessionaires have the right to exclude others from
their concession spaces to operate a concession business. Moreover, we conclude that
the totality of the circumstances indicates that Concessionaires’ revenue-generating
capability is independent of the City.
¶73

We also hold that the trial court’s adoption of the City’s valuation is consistent

with the General Assembly’s possessory interest valuation scheme set forth in section
39-1-103(17), C.R.S. (2014), and is supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on slightly different grounds.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT concurs in part and dissents in part.
JUSTICE EID dissents, and JUSTICE COATS joins in the dissent.
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JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶74

I agree with the majority that the concessionaires’ possessory interests satisfy the

tripartite test for taxation announced in Board of County Commissioners v. Vail
Associates, Inc., 19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001). Yet I disagree with the majority’s conclusion
that the City properly valued the concessionaires’ interests for property tax purposes.
In my view, the City’s “mass appraisal” approach clashes with the statutory command
to estimate the present value of future payments due under each concessionaire’s
contract. See § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. (2014). Hence, I concur with the conclusion
in Part III of the majority’s opinion but respectfully dissent from Part IV.
¶75

By holding that the Colorado Constitution requires the taxation of possessory

interests in tax-exempt property that exhibit “significant incidents of ownership,” Vail
Associates carried the legislature’s possessory interest taxation scheme into effect. 19
P.3d at 1280; ch. 297, sec. 4, § 39-1-103(17), 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1849, 1852 (providing a
method for the valuation of possessory interests in tax-exempt land “if the Colorado
supreme court holds that the Colorado constitution requires” such taxation). That
taxation scheme is embodied in section 39-1-103(17), C.R.S. (2014). Section 103(17)(a)
begins with the observation that “the valuation of possessory interests in exempt
properties is uncertain and highly speculative.” It then sets forth specific standards to
allay the risk of unequal valuations. Id. The Assessor’s Reference Library (ARL) fleshes
these standards out with guidelines that are binding on all assessors. Huddleston v. Bd.
of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15, 18 (Colo. 1996). This case is our first opportunity to
interpret the legislative scheme.
1

¶76

As the majority explains, section 39-1-103(17)(a)(II) prescribes a two-step method

for the valuation of possessory interests under the cost or income approach to appraisal.
The assessor must first determine “the present value of the reasonably estimated future
annual rents or fees required to be paid” under the contract. § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A).
The assessor should use “the actual contract rents or fees reasonably expected to be paid
. . . unless it is shown” that these “are not representative of the market rents or fees paid
for that type of real or personal property, in which case the market rents or fees” should
be substituted. Id. Pursuant to section 103(17)(a)(II)(B), the assessor then subtracts any
amounts “paid for all rights other than the exclusive right to use and possess the . . .
property.”

For contracts that define rent as a percentage of revenue, the ARL

recommends that the assessor compile current market rates for comparable properties.
3 Assessor’s Reference Library 7.79 (rev. Mar. 2014). If the percentage amount is higher,
the ARL suggests that the difference should be excluded as the value of the business, as
opposed to the value of the property. Id. In other words, the ARL bases the value of
the possessory interest on the market rent whenever that value differs from actual rent.
¶77

The City calculated the present value of the concessionaires’ interests using the

minimum monthly guaranteed rent described in the concession agreements—$56 per
square foot for most.

The City’s valuation expert testified that this value was a

reasonable approximation of future payments because it was the rent floor set by the
agreements.

Although most concessionaires paid a higher amount equal to a

percentage of their monthly gross revenues, none would ever pay less than the
minimum monthly guarantee. The expert further testified that the minimum monthly
2

guarantee represents the market rate at DIA because DIA is its own market. This
approach dismisses as irrelevant data from other, similar airports. More significantly, it
assumes a uniform value across the different neighborhoods at DIA.
¶78

That assumption is incorrect.

Passenger traffic varies from concourse to

concourse, and as a result, so does the value of real estate at DIA. According to trial
testimony, about half of the passengers at DIA travel through the B Concourse. As a
result, one concessionaire does five times as much business at its B Concourse location
than at its (otherwise identical) location in the Main Terminal. This difference proves
that a square foot of space on the B Concourse is worth more than a square foot of space
in the Main Terminal.

Instead of accounting for this variation, however, the City

applied a uniform value across the different neighborhoods at DIA, which led to an
incorrect valuation of the concessionaires’ interests. See Bd. of Assessment Appeals v.
Sampson, 105 P.3d 198, 207 (Colo. 2005) (explaining that a taxpayer who can
demonstrate that an assessment is incorrect is entitled to relief).
¶79

The statute required the City to make a “reasonabl[e] estimate[]” of future

payments under the concession agreements as the basis for calculating the actual value
of the concessionaires’ interests. § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A). The City’s “mass appraisal”
approach did not comport with this requirement. The best estimate of future payments
is past payments, and the record in this case established that most of the concessionaires
paid a percentage of their monthly gross revenue, not the minimum monthly guarantee.
See, e.g., City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 848 P.2d 355, 360–61
(Colo. 1993) (“[A]ctual rent received [is] a factor in determining the value of the
3

property . . . .”). Rather than assume that all concessionaires would pay the minimum
monthly guarantee for the life of the agreements, the City should have estimated the
actual value of the concessionaires’ interests based upon each concessionaire’s historic
rent payments.
¶80

The statute also required the City to use comparable market rents to calculate the

actual value of the concessionaires’ interests where “it is shown” that actual rents are
not representative of market rents. § 39-1-103(17)(a)(II)(A). It is thus incumbent on the
assessor to inquire into the market rate and compare it to the actual contract rent.
Especially where actual rent is a percentage of revenue, the ARL directs the assessor to
research comparable properties because percentage rent likely comprises some value
attributable to the business, which should be separated from the value of the property
interest. The City circumvented this step with the facile assumption that the only
comparable market for concessions at DIA was the concessions at DIA; therefore the
actual rents paid by the concessionaires (approximated as the minimum monthly
guarantee) equaled the market rent. This syllogism disregards the purpose of market
comparison, which is to determine whether rents paid by the concessionaires at DIA
were representative of rents for similar properties outside of DIA. The statute and the
ARL required a more thorough inquiry from the City. Absent that inquiry, it is unclear
whether market rents should have been substituted for actual rents to calculate the
value of the concessionaires’ interests.
¶81

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s “mass valuation” of the concessionaires’

interests based on the assumption that they would all pay the minimum monthly
4

guarantee for the duration of their concession agreements departed from the statutory
scheme and led to an incorrect valuation. To hew to the statute, the City should have
calculated the actual contract rent for each concessionaire based on the percentage rent
historically paid by that concessionaire, and compared that amount to the current
market rate for similar properties. I would remand this case to the court of appeals with
instructions to return it to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the value
of the concessionaires’ interests according to the method set forth in section
103(17)(a)(II). I therefore respectfully dissent from Part IV of the majority opinion.
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JUSTICE EID, dissenting.
¶82

The majority holds that the Concessionaires’ possessory interests are taxable

because they meet the three-part test of Board of County Commissioners v. Vail
Associates, Inc., 19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001). I have no issue with the majority’s recitation
of the three factors, including the independence prong, which requires “an interest that
provides a revenue-generating capability to the private owner independent of the
government property owner.” Id. at 1279. The problem with the majority’s opinion is
that it simply applies the three-factor test without fleshing out what the test is meant to
capture—namely, the “significant incidents of private ownership” that make the
interest taxable in the first place. Id. In my view, an ownership interest is “significant”
when it is akin to “private ownership,” as was the case in Vail Associates. Id. at 1267,
1278–80 (finding the “occupancy, use, and enjoyment of 12,590 acres of federal land . . .
for the operation of its ski area through [the year 2031]” demonstrated “significant
incidents of private ownership” and thus was taxable). Without a sense of what counts
as a “significant” ownership interest, application of the factors devolves into the simple
identification of any evidence that the particular factor exists. For example, under the
majority’s approach, any evidence that the Concessionaires’ operations are independent
of government control—however meager that may be—is sufficient to meet the
independence prong. In the end, the majority’s analysis leads to the result that the
legislature sought to avoid—namely, “that the taxation of any possessory interest might
lead to the taxation of all possessory interests, no matter how de minimis.” Id. at 1278.
Because the majority simply applies the three-part test of Vail Associates without a
1

sense of what counts as a “significant” private ownership interest, I respectfully dissent
from its opinion.
¶83

We derived the three-part test in Vail Associates from Mesa Verde Company v.

Montezuma Board of County Commissioners (Mesa Verde I), 495 P.2d 229 (Colo. 1972),
which involved the taxation of various facilities and improvements built on national
park land since 1937 by the park’s exclusive concessioner. The concessioner argued that
the improvements were, like the land, owned by the federal government, and thus were
tax exempt. Id. at 230. We rejected that position, concluding that the only thing that
distinguished the concessioner’s interest in the improvements from full private
ownership was the fact that the concessioner lacked “bare legal title” to them. Id. at
233. We noted that the contract between the concessioner and the government gave the
concessioner “a possessory interest in all [improvements] consisting of all incidents of
ownership, except legal title.” Id. at 230, 232 (emphasis added). “[I]t appears,” we
continued, “that the [concessioner] has full use of the improvements, as well as the right
to operate these properties for private profit.” Id. at 233. In such cases, “where a party
has the right to possession, use, enjoyment, and profits of the property,” it cannot avoid
a “fair and just share of state taxation.” Id. (concluding that “all the evidence indicates
that the most significant incidents of ownership are possessed” by the concessioner).
¶84

We distilled this language from Mesa Verde I into the three-part test in Vail

Associates: “(1) an interest that provides a revenue-generating capability to the private
owner independent of the government property owner; (2) the ability of the possessory
interest owner to exclude others from making the same use of the interest; and (3)
2

sufficient duration of the possessory interest to realize a private benefit therefrom.”
19 P.3d at 1279 (citing Mesa Verde I, 495 P.2d at 233). But importantly, the factors grew
out of the “significant incidents” of ownership that the concessioner possessed by
contract in Mesa Verde I—namely, “all incidents of ownership” except for legal title.
495 P.2d at 232. Similarly, Vail’s permit from the federal government “entitled Vail to
the occupancy, use, and enjoyment of 12,590 acres of federal land . . . for operation of its
ski area through . . . 2031”—that is, all but legal title. 19 P.3d at 1267. Indeed, the fact
that Vail’s interest was akin to private ownership was so obvious we hardly analyzed
the interest. Id. at 1280 (simply stating, without analysis, that the three-part test was
met); see also maj. op. ¶ 43 (noting that “[w]e discussed neither the source of the ski
resort’s revenues nor any restrictions the government placed on the resort’s
operations”).
¶85

In sum, when we spoke in Mesa Verde I and Vail Associates of significant

incidents of ownership, we were talking about an interest analogous to private
ownership. In both cases, the government owned the land, but the concessioner owned
and substantially controlled the operations that took place on the land to such a degree
as to be analogous to a private owner. Their interests were therefore taxable.
¶86

The possessory interests held by the Concessionaires in this case bear no

resemblance to the interests at issue in Mesa Verde I and Vail Associates. The City
controls virtually every aspect of the Concessionaires’ business.

As the majority

acknowledges, maj. op. ¶¶ 9, 51–54, it controls what products they can sell, what their
menus must include, what they can charge for their products, what hours they must
3

operate, whom they may hire, and what improvements they may make. In my view,
the Concessionaires’ control of their business operations is not analogous to private
ownership, and therefore their possessory interests do not display the requisite
“significant incidents of private ownership.” Future cases might be closer and require
difficult line drawing, but this is not one of them.
¶87

The majority applies the independence prong to these facts and concludes that

“the City’s operating restrictions in this case do not deprive Concessionaires of the
independent revenue-generating capability of their concession spaces.” Id. at ¶ 41. In
other words, as long as a concessioner has any independence to generate revenue, its
interest is taxable. And as the majority later concludes, although the City controls
“some” aspects of their business, these operating restrictions do not “convert
Concessionaires into agents or partners of the City.” Id. at ¶ 54. This is simply the
other side of the “any independence” coin: as long as a concessioner is not a
government entity, any possessory interest it may hold must be taxable.

But

importantly, this is precisely the situation the legislature sought to avoid—namely, that
the taxation of any possessory interest would lead to the taxation of all possessory
interests, “no matter how de minimis.”

Vail Associates, 19 P.3d at 1278.

In Vail

Associates, we expressly disavowed such a result, stating that “[o]ur decision does not
reach so far.” Id. But today the majority has reached “so far.”
¶88

In the end, if a set of factors is applied without regard to the ultimate goal to be

reached, the factors amount to nothing more than a list to be checked off and added up.
But we have expressly disavowed this approach in other contexts, including, most
4

recently, the set of factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant’s
statements during custodial interrogation are voluntary. See, e.g., People v. Liggett,
2014 CO 72, ¶ 22, 334 P.3d 231, 237 (cautioning that a list of thirteen factors used to
determine whether a defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation were
voluntary must be applied not as a mechanical checklist, but rather “to inform the
ultimate inquiry, which is whether the police’s conduct was coercive so as to overbear
the defendant’s will”) (citing People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 16, 325 P.3d 583, 587).
Here, the ultimate inquiry is whether the possessory interest in question approximates
private ownership such that it is taxable.
¶89

Under my analysis, it is unnecessary to reach the valuation question in this case.

I note, however, that the “significant incidents of private ownership” question is related
to the valuation component; if the ultimate taxable interest is not adequately developed
and defined, difficulties in placing a value on that interest will follow. See maj. op. ¶¶
57–71; conc. & dis. op. ¶¶ 77–81.

Because I do not believe the Concessionaires’

possessory interests are taxable in the first instance, I respectfully dissent from the
majority’s opinion holding otherwise.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE COATS joins in this dissent.
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